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The threat posed by smoking to health in India is severe. Already 1 in 5 of all adult male deaths and
1 in 20 of all adult female deaths at ages 30-69 are due to smoking and India will soon have 1 million
smoking deaths a year. Increasing tobacco prices has been found to be the single most effective method
to reduce smoking. Yet, bidis, the most common form of smoked tobacco in India, are largely untaxed,
while cigarettes are taxed at about 40% of retail price, well below the 65–80% rate noted by the World
Bank in countries with effective tobacco control policies. Moreover, low and stagnant tax rates have
occurred in a period in which all tobacco products have become more affordable with income growth.
First, we use data from the most recent three consecutive quinquennial National Sample Survey (NSS)
rounds (NSS 50, 55 and 61 conducted in 1993/94, 1999/00 and 200/05) and a two-equation system
of budget shares and unit values that attempts to correct for quality and measurement error. Second,
we pool data from the most recent nine rounds of NSS (NSS 55-57, 59-64, conducted between 1999/00
to 2007/08). Our analyses of single and repeated cross-sections yield own-price elasticity for bidis
that are roughly in keeping with existing evidence. We find that a 10% increase in bidi prices would
reduce the demand for bidis by about 6 to 9.5%. We find, however, that own-price elasticity for cigarettes
in India is substantially larger than previously thought. Our estimates suggest that cigarette users are
at least as responsive as bidi users to price changes. On the whole, our analyses suggest that low SES
households are likely more responsive to price changes than high SES households. Our analyses also
uncovers important and policy-relevant cross-prices effects. Findings from this study provide additional
evidence of the effectiveness of tobacco prices at reducing tobacco use.
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INTRODUCTION 
Tobacco smoking and chewing are both common in India (Government of India, 2010; Rani et 
al., 2003), but the individual risks from smoking are markedly greater (Gajalakshmi et al., 2003; 
Jha et al., 2008). Already 1 in 5 of all adult male deaths and 1 in 20 of all adult female deaths at 
ages 30-69 are due to smoking and India will soon have 1 million smoking deaths a year (Jha et 
al., 2008). The direct medical costs of treating smoking tobacco attributable diseases in India 
have been estimated to exceed $900 million in 2004 (John et al., 2009). Moreover, the use of 
tobacco has been associated with impoverishment through borrowing and distress selling of 
assets due to costs of hospitalization (Bonu et al., 2005). The most common type of smoking 
tobacco product are bidis, followed by cigarettes.
1 While both increase the risks of death (even 
only a few bidis a day), smoking cigarettes, especially at daily amounts common in high-income 
Western countries appears to confer especially high risks (Jha et al., 2008). Smoking in India 
varies hugely by product and rural/urban strata and is more common among the poor and less 
educated (Government of India, 2010).  
 
Increasing tobacco prices has been found to be the single most effective method to reduce 
smoking (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2011). 
Yet, bidis, the most common form of smoked tobacco in India, are largely untaxed, while 
cigarettes are taxed at about 40% of retail price, well below the 65–80% rate noted by the World 
Bank in countries with effective tobacco control policies (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999; Jha et al., 
2011). Moreover, low and stagnant tax rates have occurred in a period in which all tobacco 
                                                           
1 Also known as beedis, beeris or biris, bidis are slim, hand-rolled, unfiltered cigarettes rolled in a tendu leaf or 
temburni leaf and held together by a cotton thread that contain about ¼
 the tobacco of cigarettes. Bidis are available 
branded and unbranded and are four to eight cm in length (John, 2008b). 
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products have become more affordable with income growth (Jha et al., 2011). The lack of 
sustained increases in taxation is in part due to misconceptions about severe economic harm to 
the poor. Consumption taxes, such as those imposed on tobacco, are sometimes described as 
regressive. A tax is said to be regressive if the ratio of tax paid to income is lower for higher-
income groups. If the poor are more responsive to changes in prices, an increase in tobacco taxes 
would lead to a relatively larger reduction in tobacco use among the lowest income group 
(relative to higher-income groups) and generally encourage that group to reduce smoking and 
thus mitigate the large economic burden that it imposes, making an increase in tobacco tax even 
progressive.  
 
There is a small but growing body of research that examines the effect of tobacco prices on 
tobacco use in India specifically and more generally in countries of South Asia. John (John, 
2005; John, 2008a) using data from two quinquennial rounds of the National Sample Survey 
(NSS) of India conducted in 1993/94 and 1999/00 (NSS 50 and NSS 55) finds negative and 
significant own-price elasticities for bidis with effect sizes ranging between -0.7 and -0.9 with no 
substantial differences between rural and urban households. John using NSS 50 finds positive 
and insignificant own-price elasticity for cigarettes while using NSS 55, he finds negative own-
price elasticity of cigarettes but only significant for rural household with effect sizes of about -
0.35. Finally, John, using NSS 55 also finds weak evidence that cigarettes and bidis may be 
complements among rural households.  
 
Research conducted using data from Bangladesh (Nargis et al., 2010), Nepal (Karki et al., 2003), 
Pakistan (Mushtaq et al., 2011), Sri Lanka (Arunatilake, 2002) and time-series cross-sectional   3
data from seven South-East Asia countries (Guindon et al., 2003) suggest that individuals of 
South Asia are responsive to changes in the prices of cigarettes and bidis. Effect sizes, however, 
vary substantially within and across studies. Nargis et al. (2010) using data from the 2009 
International Tobacco Control Bangladesh Survey and two-part models find negative and 
statistically significant own-price participation elasticities for bidis (-0.46) and cigarettes (-0.29) 
but fairly small own-price conditional elasticities. Own-price participation elasticities for bidis 
and cigarettes are found to be substantially higher among low- and mid-socioeconomic status 
(SES) individuals relative to high-SES individuals. Karki et al. (2003) using data from the 2000 
Nepal Smoking Behaviour Survey and two-part models find fairly large own-price participation 
(-0.46) and conditional (-0.42) elasticities for bidis/cigarettes. Own-price conditional elasticities, 
but not participation, are found to be higher among low- and mid-SES individuals relative to 
high-SES individuals. Arunatilake (2002) using household-level data from the 1999/2000 Sri 
Lanka Integrated Survey and two-part models finds that tobacco prices have no effect on tobacco 
use participation but fairly large and statistically significant effect on tobacco consumption. 
Own-price conditional elasticities are not found to vary between SES categories. Mushtaq et al. 
(2011) using aggregate annual data (1981-2009) and autoregressive distributed lag models find 
fairly large and statistically significant short-run (-0.48) and long-run (-1.17) total own-price 
elasticities for cigarettes. Guindon et al. (2003) use time-series cross-sectional data from seven 
South-East Asia countries (Bangladesh, Burma, Indonesia, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand) and various estimators (OLS, GLS, 2SLS, Andersen-Hsiao) and find moderate to large 
statistically significant short-run total own-price elasticities (-0.10 to -0.65) and large and 
statistically significant long-run total own-price elasticities (-0.80 to -1.40).  
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The scarcity of India-specific research combined with the heterogeneity in methods and findings 
of other South Asian studies warrants additional research. Moreover, little research has explored 
the complementarity or substitutability between different tobacco products such as bidis and 
cigarettes and between tobacco and alcohol products in countries of South Asia and more 
generally in low- and middle-income countries. More importantly, the sheer current and 
projected death and health toll attributable to smoking in India warrants, in and of itself, 
additional research that can inform decision makers interested in improving the health and 
quality of life of the Indian population. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
First, we use data from the most recent three quinquennial NSS rounds and a two-equation 
system of budget shares and unit values proposed by Deaton (Deaton, 1990, 1997) that attempts 
to correct for quality
2 and measurement error. Second, we pool data from the most recent nine 
rounds of NSS (NSS 55 to NSS 64)
3 and use a simple share-log functional form (Deaton, 1989; 
Gibson and Rozelle, 2005). 
 
The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) conducts nationally representative 
socioeconomic surveys of households covering various subjects on a near-annual basis. The 
primary focus of the five-yearly rounds generally are the characteristics of the household, 
including detailed information on consumption expenditure and demographic and employment 
characteristics of individual members. The survey duration typically spans a year and 
                                                           
2 Deaton defines quality as “the value of a bundle of goods at fixed reference prices relative to its physical volume 
(Deaton, 1997 p. 297)”. 
 
3 NSS 50 does not have district identifiers; NSS 58’s data dictionary contains errors that prevent us from 
appropriately reading the data files; and, NSS 65 does not have household consumer expenditure component.   5
approximately two-thirds of the surveyed households are from rural areas. NSS quinquennial 
rounds are generally conducted in all states and union territories between July and June. NSS 50 
was conducted from July 1993 to June 1994. A total of 115,354 households (69,206 rural and 
46,148 urban) were surveyed from 6951 villages and 4650 urban blocks. NSS 55 survey was 
conducted between July 1999 and June 2000. Data were collected from 71,385 rural households 
from 5997 villages and 48,924 urban households from 4107 urban blocks. NSS 61 conducted 
between July 2004 and June 2005, covered a sample of 79,298 rural and 45,346 urban 
households spread over 7999 villages and 4602 urban blocks, respectively. Table A1 summarizes 
the timing, number of households, urban/rural distribution, village/urban block distribution for 
all NSS rounds used in the analyses. 
 
We use information from the household consumption expenditure questionnaire (Schedule 1.0) 
of each of NSS surveys described above. Schedule 1.0 collects detailed data on the consumption 
of various durable and nondurable goods, and services. For each commodity, total quantity 
consumed and the total value of consumption by the household are recorded. For food and 
intoxicant items, all NSS rounds used a recall period of 30 days while NSS 55 round used two 
distinct recall periods (30 days and 7 days). We used consumption data collected under a 30 day 
recall period for all survey rounds.
4 Among the tobacco products and other intoxicants included 
in Schedule 1.0, we focus on the most popular smoking products: bidis and cigarettes. We also 
explore the cross-price effects between smoking tobacco products and the most popular alcohol 
                                                           
4 John (2005) used both 30-day and 7-day recall data in his analyses and found qualitatively similar results. NSS 60 
used a 30-day and 7-day recall on distinct households (unlike NSS 55 that used both recall periods on the same 
households). We only include in our pooled analyses households that reported their expenditures and consumption 
using a 30-day recall period. 
   6
product, country liquor.
5 We do not examine ‘leaf tobacco’ even though it is consumed by a non-
negligible number of household (about 12-15%). First, various types of leaf tobacco are included 
in the product category ‘leaf tobacco’, including chewable tobacco and leaf tobacco burnt and 
powdered for brushing teeth. Second, our examination of unit values finds that leaf tobacco unit 
values sometimes have bi-modal distributions. A small number of households (substantially less 
than 1%) report consuming home-grown or having received as gifts bidis, cigarettes or country 
liquor; we exclude them from our analyses.
6 
 
We inspected unit values for outliers. First, we charted box plots and histograms. Second, we 
removed unit values whose logarithms lied more than 5 standard deviations from the mean (Cox 
and Wohlgenant, 1986; Deaton and Tarozzi, 2000; Gibson and Rozelle, 2005; Prais and 
Houthakker, 1955). To ensure models are not sensitive to alternative approaches, we performed 
sensitivity analyses: first, we included all unit values – even the ones that are absurdly high and 
low – to allow comparison with earlier research;
7 second, we removed unit values whose 
logarithms lied more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of logarithms. 
 
Unit values, unlike market prices, are affected by the choice of quality: at least to some extent, a 
unit value is chosen. For example, wealthier households may tend to purchase higher priced 
cigarettes so that reported unit values may be positively related to total expenditure. Because unit 
values are derived from reported expenditures and quantities, measurement error in both quantity 
                                                           
5 Country liquor is a locally distilled products made from fruits and grain such as sugar cane, palm, coconut and rice 
(Chowdhury et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2003). 
 
6 The datasets obtained from NSSO for NSS 50, 56 and 57 do not contain a ‘source code’. Hence, we are unable to 
exclude smoking tobacco or country liquor that are homegrown or that have been received as gifts. 
 
7 For example, John (John, 2005; John, 2008a) do not remove any outliers: bidi unit values of 0.004 Rs and 100 Rs 
per stick and cigarette unit values of 0.025 Rs and 200 Rs per stick are included.   7
and expenditure will be transmitted to measurement error in the unit value. The two equations for 
the budget share and unit value are: 
 
 
where:   is the share of the budget devoted to good g, by household h in cluster c,  is the 
unit value of good g, by household h in cluster c, x is total expenditure, p is the unobserved price 
of the good, f  is a cluster-level effect and   and   are idiosyncratic errors. 
 
Deaton’s two-equation system approach assumes there is no price variations within each cluster. 
The validity of this assumption requires both geographical proximity of the households and that 
households be interviewed at approximately the same time (Deaton, 1990). Hence, the variation 
in unit values within each cluster reflects differences in quality and measurement errors. The 
variation in budget shares and unit values within clusters is used to identify the effect of total 
household expenditures, household size and other household characteristics on the quantity and 
quality demanded. The coefficients   and   represent the elasticity of quantity demanded 
with respect to total expenditure and the elasticity of the unit value with respect to total 
expenditure (i.e. quality elasticity). The total expenditure elasticity is   where 
budget shares are evaluated at their means.  
 
Implementing Deaton’s approach involves three stages. First, the effects of household 
characteristics are removed from budget shares and unit values (i.e. purging the quality effects). 
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between-cluster error-in-variables regressions. In the third stage, the price and quality effects are 
disentangled relying on a separability assumption. We use the symmetry restrictions to add to the 
precision of the parameter estimates.
8 
 
Household surveys typically collect data on clusters of households that live together in the same 
rural or urban geographical areas (Deaton, 1989). In India, clusters are typically villages in rural 
areas and urban blocks
9 in urban areas. As noted by Deaton, a potential problem is that cluster 
sizes are often quite small, sometimes as small as four or six households. Even after averaging at 
the village- and urban block-level, the measurement error may remain quite serious (Deaton, 
1989). The measurement error will likely be more severe for goods that are consumed by few 
households. Such is the case of tobacco products such as bidis and especially cigarettes that are 
consumed by only a minority of households. An additional problem is that if none of the 
household surveyed in a particular cluster have positive consumption, every household in such a 
cluster ends up being removed from the unit value regressions. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for cluster-level unit values. We present descriptive statistics for unit values at both 
village/urban block- and district-level.
10 A district is an administrative region of a state or 
territory. As is traditionally done, we treat villages and urban blocks as clusters. Additionally, 
because most households do not consume any cigarettes, we treat districts as clusters. The latter 
approach assumes there is no price variations within each district. As mentioned earlier, the 
validity of this assumption requires both geographical proximity of the households and that 
                                                           
8 The substitution matrix of the demand system is symmetric if, and only if,  . 
 
9 Each city or town are demarcated into urban blocks: small, compact subdivisions each having a population of 
about 600 to 800, or 120 to 160 households (Government of India, 2001). 
 
10 As of 1 January 2011, there were 631 districts, 28 states and 7 Union territories. In 1999, there were 543 districts, 
25 states and 7 Union territories, while in 2004, there were 555 districts, 28 states and 7 Union territories. 
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households be interviewed at approximately the same time. NSSO interviews households within 
the same villages or urban blocks at approximately the same time. The same, however, is not true 
for households within the same district who are sampled throughout the year. This is unlikely to 
be of consequence, however, as overall inflation was relatively modest in 1999/00 and 2004/04. 
We nevertheless perform sensitivity analyses and adjust unit values and total expenditures for 
overall inflation.  
 
We apply Deaton’s approach to the three most recent quinquennial rounds of NSS consumer 
expenditures surveys (NSS 50, 55 and 61). We present results treating both villages/urban blocks 
and districts as clusters for NSS 55 and 61. For NSS 50 we only present results treating 
villages/urban blocks as clusters because NSS 50 does not contain a district identifier.  
 
The low mean number of households with non-zero purchases of cigarettes (i.e. about 2 per 
village or urban block) renders the examination of subsamples problematic. Additionally, an 
important feature of Deaton’s approach is that its consistency properties depend on the number 
of clusters (and not on the number of households). Hence, in order to examine the impact of 
smoking tobacco and alcohol prices across socioeconomic strata, we pool the most recent nine 
NSS rounds (NSS 55-57, 59-64), treating districts as clusters, and use a share-log functional 
form (Deaton, 1989; Gibson and Rozelle, 2005): 
 
where   is the share of the budget devoted to good g, by household h, x is total household 
expenditure, z is a vector of household characteristics,   are prices (using unit values as 






proxies) and   are idiosyncratic errors. The price elasticities are    where   is 
the Kronecker delta (equal to 1 if g = j or to 0 otherwise) and budget shares are evaluated at their 
means. We adjust all unit values and total expenditures to constant July-September 2004 Rs (i.e. 
NSS sub-round/quarter 1) using India’s consumer price index for industrial workers (CPI-IW). 
We average unit values by cluster and include only households under examination. For example, 
when examining the price responsiveness of rural households, we average unit values by cluster 
using only unit values reported by rural households. As a sensitivity check, we estimate models 
where we average unit values by cluster over all households. In order to capture regional and 
temporal variations that may be related to price, we include quarterly and regional dummies.
11 
The boundaries of several districts and some states have changed between NSS 55 and NSS 64.
12 
We recode all districts and states to ensure that they represent the same geographic area between 
all NSS rounds. 
 
As various household characteristics that determine a household’s taste and preferences may also 
affect a household’s choice of unit value or budget share, in addition to total monthly household 
expenditures, household size, we included the following controls: religion (Hindu, Islam, 
Christian, Sikh, others), urban/rural strata, share of men in household, share of adults in 
household, and household head’s education (seven binary indicators ranging from ‘not literate’ 
                                                           
11 We include dummies for NSS regions (n ≈ 75) in our village/urban block models and dummies for India regions 
(n = 6) in our district models. India regions are coded as follows: Central (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh); East (Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal); North (Chandigar, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, 
Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Uttaranchal); Northeast (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya,  Manipur, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura); South (Andaman & Nicober, Andhra Pardesh, Karnataka, Lakshadweep, Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu, Pondicheri); West (Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Goa, Gujarat, Maharastra). 
 
12 For example, in 1995 Karur and Perambalur districts split from Tiruchirappalli District. In 2001, the Ariyalur 
district was carved out of Perambalur district, merged back with Perambalur in 2002 and split again in 2007. Our 
district and state coding schemes is available upon request. 
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to ‘above secondary education’), sex, age and age squared.  In our pooled analyses, we included 
dummy indicators for NSS rounds. We estimated Deaton’s two-equation system of budget shares 
and unit values using Stata codes made available by Deaton (Deaton, 1997). We estimated the 
share-log functional form specification using multilevel regressions. Three-level models were fit 
for household h nested within district d nested within state s. The hierarchical structure of our 
dataset was 477,007 households nested within 471 districts nested within 34 states.
13 The 
average number of observations within each level was: 1012 households per districts, and 14 
districts per state. All models were estimated using Stata/MP 11.2 for Macintosh. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for cluster-level unit values while Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for budget shares. Descriptive statistics are presented for the most recent 
three quinquennial NSS rounds (NSS 50, 55 and 61) and for the most recent ‘thin’ NSS round 
(NSS 64). Unit values in Table 1 have not been adjusted for inflation. The difference in unit 
values between bidis and cigarettes is substantial across all NSS rounds. For example, in 
2007/08, a bundle of 10 bidis would costs about 2 Rs while a pack of 10 cigarettes would cost 
about 20 Rs. Table 1 shows clearly the very small number of unit value data points per 
village/urban blocks. The proportion of household that reported purchasing bidis has decreased 
substantially in both rural and urban areas between 1993/94 and 2007/08 (Table 2). The 
proportion of household who reported purchasing cigarettes decreased between 1993/94 and 
2004/05 and then increased quite markedly between 2004/05 and 2007/08. Changes between 
1993/94 and 2007/08 differ markedly between urban/rural strata. For example, the proportion of 
                                                           
13  India is a union of twenty-eight states and seven union territories. Consumption of alcohol is prohibited in 
Lakshadweep, the smallest union territory of India. As none of the households surveyed in Lakshadweep report 
consuming country liquor, they are removed from the analyses.    12
urban household who reported purchasing cigarettes decreased slightly between 1993/94 and 
2007/08 while among rural households it increased by more than 20%. These trends are more or 
less in keeping with individual-level smoking trends between 1998 and 2010 (Joseph et al., 
2011).  
 
We first present the results for each individual NSS quinquennial rounds using Deaton’s 
approach of two-equation system of budget shares and unit values. We then present the results of 
our pooled analysis. 
 
Single cross-sectional surveys: NSS quinquennial rounds 
Table 3 presents the results of the within-cluster regressions for unit values and budget shares. 
The coefficients of total household expenditures (in natural log) in the unit value regressions 
represent expenditure elasticities of quality. For example, a doubling of total expenditure would 
raise the price paid for cigarettes by about 13.5 to 20%. In the within-cluster regressions for 
budget shares, a positive coefficient indicates the share of the budget spent on the good rises with 
total expenditure. Total expenditure elasticity (i.e. the sum of expenditure elasticity of quantity 
and quality) varies across tobacco products in size but not in direction. It is positive for bidis and 
cigarettes suggesting that an increase in total household expenditure would result in an increase 
in expenditure of smoking tobacco. Estimates of total expenditure elasticity do not vary 
appreciably between NSS rounds nor do they vary by specifications (i.e. using village/urban 
block vs. district as clusters). The last two columns of Table 3 present the impact of a 6%   13
increase in total household expenditures on quality and budget shares.
14 Our results suggest, for 
example, that a 6% increase in total household expenditures in 2004/05 would have increased the 
price paid for a bundle of bidis (25) by about 0.04-0.07 Rs, for pack of cigarettes (10) by about 
1.2-1.6 Rs and for country liquor (1 litre) by about 2.0-5.9 Rs. Similarly, a 6% increase in total 
household expenditures would be expected to increase budget shares (among consuming 
households) by about 1% for bidis, 3-4% for cigarettes and 2-4% for country liquor. 
 
Table 4 presents the own-price elasticities for two smoking tobacco products – bidi and cigarette 
– together with bootstrapped standard errors (SE). The SE are obtained using Deaton’s approach  
from 1000 replications of the bootstrap using the cluster-level data and are defined as half the 
length of the interval around the bootstrap mean that contains 0.638 (the fraction of a normal 
random variable within two standard deviations of the mean) of the bootstrap replications 
(Deaton, 1997).  
 
On the whole, we find statistically significant and fairly large own-price elasticities for bidis. 
When treating villages/urban blocks as clusters, we find statistically significant own-price 
elasticities for bidis with estimates ranging from about -0.5 to -1.0. When treating districts as 
clusters, we find similar own-price elasticities for bidis using NSS 55 but not NSS 61. We do not 
find that urban and rural household respond differently to changes in bidi prices. Our sensitivity 
checks suggest that our estimates of own-price elasticities for bidis are robust to alternative 
specifications (Table A2). 
 
                                                           
14 6% represents approximately the average annual increase in inflation-adjusted total household expenditures during 
the 2000s. It also represents the IMF’s forecast of India’s inflation-adjusted annual GDP per capita growth 2011-
2016 (International Monetary Fund, 2011)   14
When treating villages/urban blocks as clusters, we find no evidence that own-price elasticities 
for cigarettes are statistically different from zero. When treating districts as clusters, however, we 
find statistically significant and large own-price elasticities for cigarettes. We find that urban 
households may be more responsive than rural households to changes in cigarette prices. On the 
whole, however, we do not find that our estimates of own-price elasticities for cigarettes are 
robust to alternative specifications (Table A2). 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2  present the cross-price elasticities. On the whole, we find little evidence that 
the cross-price effects are significantly different from zero. If anything, these results suggest 
substitutability between bidis, cigarettes and country liquor among urban households.   
 
Pooled analysis: repeated cross-sectional surveys 
Table 6 presents estimates of own-price elasticities obtained from the pooled analyses. The top 
panel presents results for regressions where we average unit values by cluster over all 
households. The bottom panel presents results for regressions where unit values have been 
averaged only over households under examination. We find negative and statistically significant 
own-price elasticities with fairly large effect sizes for bidis and cigarettes.  
 
We examined households’ price responsiveness across urban/rural strata and across 
socioeconomic status (SES) using three measures: 1) household income (proxied by total 
household expenditures, bottom three quintiles vs. top two quintiles); 2) household head’s 
education (≤ primary vs. > primary); and, 3) social groups (scheduled tribe, scheduled caste and 
other backward class vs. other social groups). We find own-price elasticities for bidis vary across   15
urban-rural strata and household income: rural households (-0.95 vs. -0.88,-0.87) and households 
with lower income (-0.95 vs. -0.86,-0.89) tend to be more responsive to changes in bidi prices. 
These differences, however, are generally not statistically significant. We do not find that own-
price elasticities for bidis vary across education or social group categories. Our estimates of own-
price elasticities for bidis are robust across alternative specifications. We find consistent 
evidence that households from lower social groups tend to be more responsive to changes in 
cigarette prices (-1.13,-1.07 vs. -0.91,-0.90). We also find some evidence that own-price 
elasticities for cigarettes may vary across urban-rural strata, household income and education but 
only when we average unit values by cluster over all households (Table 6, top panel).  
 
Table 7 and Figures 1-4 present cross-price elasticities obtained from the pooled analyses. On the 
whole, we do not find that changes in the prices of cigarettes or country liquor have any impact 
on the demand for bidis. We find statistically significant cross-price elasticities between the 
demand for cigarettes and the prices of country liquor: a 10% increase in the price of country 
liquor would increase the demand for cigarettes by about 1.2%. We find statistically significant 
cross-price elasticities between the demand for cigarettes and the prices of bidis only when using 
unit values that have been averaged only over households under examination. These estimates of 
cross-price elasticities suggest some substitutability between cigarettes and bidis among rural 
households and among lower SES households and some complementarity between cigarettes and 
bidis among higher SES households. Put differently, an increase in bidi prices would increase the 
demand for cigarettes among rural households and among low SES households and decrease the 
demand for cigarettes among high SES households. These differences, however, are generally 
not statistically significant.   16
 
DISCUSSION 
Our analyses of single and repeated cross-sections yield own-price elasticity for bidis that are 
roughly in keeping with existing evidence. We find that a 10% increase in bidi prices would 
reduce the demand for bidis by about 6 to 9.5%. We find, however, that own-price elasticity for 
cigarettes in India is substantially larger than previously thought. Our estimates suggest that 
cigarette users are at least as responsive as bidi users to price changes. On the whole, our 
analyses suggest that low SES households are likely more responsive to price changes than high 
SES households.  
 
Our analyses uncovers important and policy-relevant cross-prices effects. We find that cigarettes 
and country liquor are likely substitutes and that the substitutability tends to be larger among 
lower SES households. We also find that cross-price elasticities between bidis and cigarettes may 
vary by SES and urban/rural strata. Our findings suggest there may be some substitutability 
between cigarettes and bidis among rural and low-SES households and some complementarity 
between cigarettes and bidis among higher SES households. 
 
Our study extends existing research in a number of ways. First, in addition to NSS 50 and 55, we 
use the most recent quinquennial round, NSS 61. Second, in addition to the traditional approach 
that treats villages and urban blocks as clusters, we also treat districts as clusters. As discussed 
earlier, we feel that India’s low household cigarette smoking prevalence warrants experimenting 
with such an approach. Third, we pool nearly a decade of data combining both ‘thick’ (i.e. 
quinquennial) and ‘thin’ rounds of the National Sample Survey. This approach allows us to   17
examine price responsiveness across urban/rural strata and SES categories. In doing so, we use 
two approaches to estimate our measure of price. First, we average unit values by cluster and 
include only households under examination. This approach has the advantage of better reflecting 
market prices in the relevant geographic area. For example, it will likely better reflect prices 
faced by households living in urban or rural areas or prices faced by low-SES households 
(inasmuch as they live in similar geographic areas). Two issues are worth noting: 1) to the extent 
this price measure is based on small numbers, the prices will tend to get closer to individual self-
reported prices which may bias the elasticity estimates away from zero given the increased 
endogeneity of price; and 2) to the extent that the sample used to construct the price measure is 
non-representative, increased measurement error may bias elasticity estimates towards zero. 
Second, we estimate models where we average unit values by cluster over all households. This 
approach has the advantage of utilising the full sample of unit values and may attenuate 
measurement error. However, it may bias elasticity estimates towards zero if the price measure is 
not reflective of prices households face. We do not find that own-price elasticities for bidis differ 
across specifications. We do find, however, that our estimates of own-price elasticities for 
cigarettes from models where we average unit values by cluster over all households tend to be 
higher for rural and low-SES households,   
 
There are some limitations that merit discussion. Using three sets of price data (unit values, 
market prices and household opinions) in Papua New Guinea, Gibson and Rozelle (2005) find 
that there are substantial biases when unit values are used as a proxy for market price, even when 
sophisticated correction methods such as Deaton’s are applied. Niimi (2005) uses unit values and 
market prices to estimate a food demand system and finds that Deaton’s method generates   18
materially different price elasticities from those estimated with market prices. India’s Labour 
Bureau compiles consumer price indices for industrial workers (CPI-IW) on a monthly basis, 
using retail prices collected from 261 markets in 76 centres. The Labour Bureau also compiles 
consumer price indices for agricultural labourers and rural labourers (CPI-AL/RL) on a monthly 
basis from fixed markets in 600 sample villages in 20 states. CPI-IW data are publicly available 
at the centre-level while CPI-AL/RL are available at the market-level. An obvious avenue for 
further research is to link market prices for bidis, cigarettes and country liquor from both CPI-IW 
and CPI-AL/RL to NSS data. Household-level data, unlike individual-level data, do not allow to 
examine price responsiveness by individual characteristics such as sex or age. Household-level 
data also renders the interpretation of cross-price effects less evident. This is an important 
limitation of our analyses as smoking patterns vary considerably by type (e.g. bidi, cigarette, 
smokeless), age and sex in India. The recently available 2009/10 Global Adult Tobacco Survey 
will provide an excellent opportunity to examine further the impact of prices on tobacco use in 
India (Government of India, 2010). 
 
Findings from this study provide additional evidence of the effectiveness of tobacco prices at 
reducing tobacco use. Increasing the price of smoking tobacco products, in addition to leading to 
reduced tobacco use, can be expected to increase tax revenue. We find own-price elasticities as 
high as |-1| that are substantially larger than the consensus estimate for high-income countries of 
about |-0.4|. Even so, nearly all practicable tax increases would generate increased revenues 
(Warner, 2000). In India, bidi and cigarette taxes constitute only a fraction of total price (about 
40% for cigarettes and nearly nil for bidis at the central level). For example, assuming all taxes 
(at central and state level) constitute half of the price of a pack of cigarettes, a doubling of the tax   19
rate would increase retail price by only 50%. As pointed out by Warner, tobacco users would 
have to be extraordinarily price sensitive for consumption declines to exceed the rate of increase 
in tax (Warner, 2000), far more so than found in this study. On the whole, our findings suggest 
that using the tax system to increase the prices of bidis and cigarettes would lead to a significant 
and substantial reduction in tobacco use while increasing government tax revenue. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for cluster-level unit values 
 
n Mean Median Std. Dev. Villages Districts Villages Districts
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Bidi (1 stick) 42,033 0.09 0.08 0.03 9,623 n.a. 4.4 n.a.
Cigarette (1 stick) 10,138 0.67 0.60 0.27 4,935 n.a. 2.1 n.a.
Country liquor (1 litre) 8,910 37.1 32.0 31.5 3,815 n.a. 2.3 n.a.
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Bidi (1 stick) 31,567 0.15 0.13 0.15 7,686 478 4.1 66.0
Cigarette (1 stick) 8,794 1.33 1.00 1.54 4,214 445 2.1 19.8
Country liquor (1 litre) 8,270 55.7 40.0 53.4 3,512 441 2.4 18.8
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Bidi (1 stick) 32,751 0.17 0.16 0.10 9,232 478 3.5 68.5
Cigarette (1 stick) 9,153 1.49 1.30 1.42 4,779 461 1.9 19.9
Country liquor (1 litre) 10,462 63.2 41.3 61.7 4,638 455 2.3 23.0
‐ NSS 64 (2007/08)
Bidi (1 stick) 10,660 0.20 0.23 0.09 5,726 449 1.9 23.7
Cigarette (1 stick) 4,081 1.94 2.00 1.02 2,758 403 1.5 10.1




Mean no. of obs.
per cluster
Note: n.a. = not applicable; NSS 50: Total number of obvs. = 114,864; Total number of clusters: villages/urban
blocks = 11,601; NSS 55: Total number of obvs. = 114,350; Total number of clusters: villages/urban blocks = 
10,014; districts = 483; NSS 61: Total number of obvs. = 123,655; Total number of clusters: villages/urban 
blocks = 12,500; districts = 487; NSS 64: Total number of obvs. = 46,196; Total number of clusters: 
villages/urban blocks = 11,683; districts = 469.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for budget shares 
 
% consuming Share, total Share, consuming hh
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Bidis 0.367 0.439 0.258 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.031 0.031 0.031
Cigarettes 0.089 0.060 0.134 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.037 0.031 0.040
Country liquor 0.079 0.095 0.054 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.053 0.050 0.061
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Bidis 0.276 0.344 0.184 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.028 0.028 0.026
Cigarettes 0.077 0.053 0.110 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.037 0.035 0.038
Country liquor 0.072 0.088 0.051 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.053 0.050 0.060
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Bidis 0.265 0.312 0.183 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.028 0.029 0.027
Cigarettes 0.074 0.061 0.096 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.034 0.031 0.037
Country liquor 0.085 0.100 0.058 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.048 0.046 0.053
‐ NSS 64 (2007/08)
Bidis 0.231 0.284 0.127 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.022 0.022 0.020
Cigarettes 0.088 0.073 0.117 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.030 0.028 0.033
Country liquor 0.080 0.095 0.050 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.040 0.038 0.044
Note: hh = household
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Table 3. Within-cluster regressions for unit values and budget shares 
 
ln hh exp. ln hh size n clusters ln hh exp. ln hh size n clusters ex quality*, Rs bs*
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
‐Cluster = village/urban block
Bidis 0.018 ‐0.014 41,813 9,617 ‐0.61 0.26 114,260 11,601 0.449 0.02 0.01
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.02)
Cigarettes 0.153 ‐0.096 10,089 4,923 0.30 ‐0.28 114,260 11,601 1.771 0.62 0.04
(0.010) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01)
Country liquor 0.039 ‐0.025 8,870 3,808 0.09 ‐0.17 114,260 11,601 1.181 0.86 0.04
(0.015) (0.017) (0.01) (0.02)
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
‐Cluster = village/urban block
Bidis 0.039 ‐0.025 31,115 7,693 ‐0.36 0.01 113,136 10,013 0.491 0.09 0.01
(0.006) (0.007) (0.09) (0.01)
Cigarettes 0.198 ‐0.135 8,700 4,204 0.32 ‐0.26 113,136 10,013 1.922 1.58 0.04
(0.017) (0.019) (0.01) (0.01)
Country liquor 0.139 ‐0.111 8,189 3,502 0.14 ‐0.20 113,136 10,013 1.223 4.65 0.04
(0.026) (0.027) (0.02) (0.02)
‐Cluster = district
Bidis 0.064 ‐0.043 31,115 477 ‐0.33 0.08 113,136 482 0.500 0.15 0.01
(0.006) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01)
Cigarettes 0.185 ‐0.109 8,700 444 0.29 ‐0.24 113,136 482 1.824 1.48 0.04
(0.014) (0.017) (0.01) (0.01)
Country liquor 0.265 ‐0.184 8,189 440 0.11 ‐0.17 113,136 482 1.026 8.84 0.03
(0.024) (0.028) (0.01) (0.02)
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
‐Cluster = village/urban block
Bidis 0.014 ‐0.009 32,736 9,234 ‐0.42 0.10 123,149 12,500 0.422 0.04 0.01
(0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01)
Cigarettes 0.180 ‐0.067 9,140 4,778 0.22 ‐0.20 123,149 12,500 1.715 1.61 0.03
(0.015) (0.018) (0.01) (0.01)
Country liquor 0.052 ‐0.019 10,455 4,636 ‐0.01 ‐0.11 123,149 12,500 0.926 1.97 0.03
(0.015) (0.017) (0.01) (0.02)
‐Cluster = district
Bidis 0.029 ‐0.018 32,736 478 ‐0.40 0.09 123,149 487 0.437 0.07 0.01
(0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01)
Cigarettes 0.134 ‐0.035 9,140 461 0.20 ‐0.18 123,149 487 1.667 1.20 0.03
(0.011) (0.015) (0.01) (0.01)
Country liquor 0.155 ‐0.097 10,455 455 ‐0.01 ‐0.11 123,149 487 0.821 5.86 0.02
(0.015) (0.018) (0.01) (0.02)
Unit value regressions Budget share regressions Impact of a 6% increase in total hh exp.
Note: standard errors (SE) in parenthesis; coefficients and SE in the budget share regressions are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation; quality* = impact on
quality presented per bundle of bidis (25), cigarette pack (10) and coutry liquor (1 litre);  ex = total expenditure elasticity ; hh = household; exp. = household 
expenditures; bs* = budget shares of consuming hh.
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All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Bidis ‐0.77 ‐0.74 ‐0.74 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09)










‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Bidis ‐1.00 ‐0.97 ‐0.91 ‐1.26 ‐1.14 ‐1.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.36)
Cigarettes ‐0.08 0.31 ‐0.28 ‐1.32 ‐0.81 ‐2.19
(0.23) (0.48) (0.32) (0.24) (0.28) (1.08)
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Bidis ‐0.61 ‐0.61 ‐0.48 ‐0.28 ‐0.25 ‐0.65
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.26) (0.23) (0.34)
Cigarettes ‐0.06 0.15 ‐0.30 ‐1.31 ‐1.16 ‐1.28
(0.23) (0.35) (0.32) (0.22) (0.25) (0.34)
Note: n.a. = not applicable; Estimates shown in bold are greater than twice their 
bootstrapped standard errors (SE). See text for description of bootstrapped SE; 5 SD = unit 
values whose logarithms lied more than 5 (2.5) standard deviations from the mean were 
removed.    27
Table 5.1. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for bidis and the prices of cigarette and 
country liquor - single cross-sectional surveys 
 
Specification (cluster)
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Cigarettes 0.055 0.073 0.023 n.a n.a n.a
(0.044) (0.062) (0.086) n.a n.a n.a
Country liquor 0.089 0.101 0.059 n.a n.a n.a
(0.023) (0.025) (0.065) n.a n.a n.a
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Cigarettes ‐0.049 ‐0.078 0.000 0.025 ‐0.083 0.420
(0.033) (0.045) (0.088) (0.103) (0.098) (0.394)
Country liquor 0.018 0.015 0.070 0.097 0.072 0.239
(0.021) (0.020) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.337)
Village/urban blockD i s t rict
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Cigarettes ‐0.023 0.009 ‐0.110 0.244 0.110 0.442
(0.045) (0.060) (0.100) (0.129) (0.141) (0.166)
Country liquor 0.034 0.037 0.137 0.070 0.058 0.246
(0.027) (0.029) (0.060) (0.075) (0.077) (0.099)
Note:  n.a. = not applicable; Estimates shown in bold are greater than twice their bootstrapped standard 
errors (SE). See text for descrption of bootstrapped SE.    28
Table 5.2. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for cigarettes and the prices of bidi and 
country liquor - single cross-sectional surveys 
 
Specification (cluster)
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Bidi 0.182 0.525 0.025 n.a n.a n.a
(0.163) (0.466) (0.133) n.a n.a n.a
Country liquor 0.102 0.015 0.203 n.a n.a n.a
(0.081) (0.145) (0.130) n.a n.a n.a
Village/urban block District
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Bidi ‐0.146 ‐0.429 ‐0.007 0.056 ‐0.436 0.428
(0.090) (0.234) (0.098) (0.271) (0.498) (0.406)
Country liquor 0.042 0.106 ‐0.061 0.053 0.207 ‐0.159
(0.061) (0.108) (0.132) (0.090) (0.153) (0.429)
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Bidi ‐0.086 0.028 ‐0.165 0.729 0.519 0.596
(0.144) (0.303) (0.144) (0.391) (0.681) (0.225)
Country liquor ‐0.035 0.024 ‐0.088 0.212 0.222 0.101
(0.075) (0.139) (0.093) (0.095) (0.148) (0.100)
Note:  n.a. = not applicable; Estimates shown in bold are greater than twice their bootstrapped standard
errors (SE). See text for descrption of bootstrapped SE.    29
Table 6. Own-price elasticities –pooled analyses, 1999/00 - 2007/08 
 




‐Unit values averaged by cluster over all households
Bidis ‐0.940 ‐0.950 ‐0.884 ‐0.950 ‐0.864 ‐0.920 ‐0.943 ‐0.935 ‐0.941
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Cigarettes ‐1.026 ‐1.089 ‐1.027 ‐1.116 ‐0.993 ‐1.161 ‐0.950 ‐1.128 ‐0.907
(0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)***
‐Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination
Bidis ‐0.940 ‐0.946 ‐0.874 ‐0.954 ‐0.889 ‐0.909 ‐0.929 ‐0.942 ‐0.948
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Cigarettes ‐1.026 ‐0.963 ‐1.019 ‐0.960 ‐1.021 ‐1.015 ‐1.011 ‐1.071 ‐0.895
(0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)***
Note: Lower caste/tribe = 1) scheduled tribe; 2) scheduled caste; and, 3) other backward class
Education Social Groups Expenditure quintiles Rural/urban
All
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Table 7. Cross-price elasticities –pooled analyses, 1999/00 - 2007/08 
 
Table 7. Cross‐price elasticities –pooled analyses, 1999/00 ‐ 2007/08




 Cross‐price elasticities between the demand for bidis and the prices of cigarette and country liquor
‐Unit values averaged by cluster over all households
Cigarettes ‐0.021 ‐0.023 ‐0.004 ‐0.023 ‐0.038 ‐0.028 0.016 ‐0.020 ‐0.033
(0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015)* (0.029) (0.016) (0.027)
Country liquor ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.006 0.001 ‐0.014 ‐0.013 0.043 ‐0.003 ‐0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020)**    (0.011) 0.018
‐Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination
Cigarettes 0.000 ‐0.034 0.012 0.005 ‐0.033 ‐0.021 0.017 ‐0.043 ‐0.046
0.000 (0.013)**    (0.033) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014) (0.032) (0.015)*** (0.030)
Country liquor 0.000 0.009 ‐0.004 0.001 ‐0.013 ‐0.003 0.009 ‐0.006 0.009
0.000 (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
Cross‐price elasticities between the demand for cigarettes and the prices of bidi and country liquor
‐Unit values averaged by cluster over all households
Bidis ‐0.029 0.011 ‐0.012 0.040 ‐0.075 0.040 ‐0.052 ‐0.018 ‐0.014
(0.043) (0.068) (0.056) (0.075) (0.051) (0.075) (0.052) (0.056) (0.067)
Country liquor 0.118 0.090 0.141 0.128 0.120 0.147 0.094 0.112 0.125
(0.020)*** (0.030)*** (0.026)*** (0.033)*** (0.023)*** (0.033)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)***
‐Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination
Bidis ‐0.029 0.182 ‐0.025 0.176 ‐0.092 0.089 ‐0.112 ‐0.022 ‐0.109
(0.043) (0.067)***  (0.052) (0.081)**    (0.041)**    (0.078) (0.042)***  (0.056) (0.065)*     
Country liquor 0.118 0.087 0.101 0.176 0.110 0.151 0.047 0.112 0.084
(0.020)***  (0.029)***  (0.025)***  (0.033)***  (0.019)***  (0.034)***  (0.022)**    (0.026)***  (0.025)*** 
Note: Lower caste/tribe = 1) scheduled tribe; 2) scheduled caste; and, 3) other backward class
Expenditure quintiles Education Social Groups Rural/urban
All
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Figure 1. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for bidis and the prices of cigarettes 
 
-Unit values averaged by cluster over all households        - Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination 
 
    
 
Figure 2. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for bidis and the prices of country liquor 
 
-Unit values averaged by cluster over all households        - Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination 
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Figure 3. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for cigarettes and the prices of bidis 
 
-Unit values averaged by cluster over all households        - Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination 
    
 
Figure 4. Cross-price elasticities between the demand for cigarettes and the prices of country liquor 
 
-Unit values averaged by cluster over all households        - Unit values averaged by cluster only over households under examination 
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Table A1. National Sample Surveys, 1993/94 - 2007/08 
 
Survey round Period Rural hh Urban hh Total hh # of villages # urban blocks
NSS 50 Jul 1993 ‐ Jun 1994 69,206 46,148 115,354 6,951 4,650
NSS 55 Jul 1999 ‐ Jun 2000 71,385 48,924 120,309 5,997 4,107
NSS 56 Jul 2000 ‐ Jun 2001 21,649 35,624 57,273 5,433 8,918
NSS 57 Jul 2001 ‐ Jun 2002 25,505 37,123 62,628 6,381 9,297
NSS 59 Jan 2003 ‐ Dec 2003 26,143 14,870 41,013 6,553 3,757
NSS 60 Jan 2004 ‐ Jun 2004 18,975 10,656 29,631 4,755 2,669
NSS 61 Jul 2004 ‐ Jun 2005 79,298 45,346 124,644 7,999 4,602
NSS 62 Jul 2005 ‐ Jun 2006 18,992 20,444 39,436 4,750 5,120
NSS 63 Jul 2006 ‐ Jun 2007 33,146 30,583 63,729 5,573 7,698
NSS 64 Jul 2007 ‐ Jun 2008 31,673 18,624 50,297 7,953 4,682
Note: hh = households; Figures shown as reported by NSSO; do not necessarily identically match data contained in NSS data files.
Sample
Source: Government of India, National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Various reports. URL: http://www.mospi.gov.in/mospi_nsso_rept_pubn.htm
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Region dummies: NSS regions NSS regions Regions Regions States
Time dummies: Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters
Outliers:    ‐ 2.5 SD    ‐ 2.5 SD 5 SD
A l lA l l A l lA l lA l l
‐ NSS 50 (1993/94)
Bidis ‐0.75 ‐0.72 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.05) (0.05)
Cigarettes 0.70 0.93 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.39) (0.37)
Village/urban block District
‐ NSS 55 (1999/00)
Bidis ‐1.01 ‐0.90 ‐1.16 ‐0.62 ‐1.12
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.22) (0.13)
Cigarettes ‐0.44 0.35 ‐1.17 ‐1.36 ‐1.28
(0.16) (0.22) (0.19) (0.38) (0.56)
‐ NSS 61 (2004/05)
Bidis ‐0.74 ‐0.59 ‐0.69 ‐0.25 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.21) (0.25) (0.27)
Cigarettes ‐0.13 0.83 ‐1.17 ‐1.75 ‐1.22
(0.25) (0.29) (0.19) (0.33) (0.22)
Note: n.a. = not applicable; Estimates shown in bold are greater than twice their 
bootstrapped standard errors (SE). See text for description of bootstrapped SE; 5 (2.5) SD 
= unit values whose logarithms lied more than 5 (2.5) standard deviations from the mean 
were removed.  
 